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ABSTRACT 
From a systems perspective, this paper examines 
the challenges of a single system to support 
multiple Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) space 
exploration missions and the need for unitary 
responsibility for the system. The focus is a 
Mission Operations System (MOS), which is 
effectively a mission management organization with 
direct authority over data system operations, 
command sequencing, flight operations control, 
data management, trajectory determination, 
telemetry and data acquisition, and spacecraft 
analysis. Stratagems for training and the approach 
to processes, procedures, and interfaces to facilitate 
the transition from the present situation to a truly 
multimission operational environment are 
developed. 
The outcome is a paradigm for a MOS that is 
achievable, that can effectively support multiple 
projects, and that can take advantage of 
technological changes without perturbing the entire 
system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In lean economic times, government expenditures 
receive close scrutiny. Certainly space programs 
where the benefit is not always intuitively obvious 
are subject to as close a look as any expense. One 
such project currently affected by cutbacks is 
Magellan, which is being terminated even though 
the spacecraft itself remains capable of operations 
for an extended period of time. This paper 
addresses one means by which a key factor in the 
Magellan demise may be mitigated for future 
projects, examines the Mission Operations System 
(MOS) for flight projects to see where change may 
be appropriate, and suggests a model for that 
potential change. 
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2. WHY CHANGE 
It is clear from NASA’s call for smaller, better, 
CHEAPER missions to explore space that costs are 
a major consideration in Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL) flight projects. The MOS is one prominent 
cost source that can be focused on for reduction. 
This is primarily due to the growth potential for 
these costs as we build better spacecraft that can 
and often must achieve longer missions. Magellan 
is a timely case in point. The projected costs of 
continuing the mission exceed the cost that can be 
justified by the anticipated return over the life of 
the spacecraft itself. Thus, endeavoring to reduce 
operational costs is an important aim in the 
continuation of space exploration. A contributing 
factor to the continuing accumulation of costs is the 
tendency of our interplanetary probes to 
substantially exceed their planned lifetimes. 
However, beyond the longevity of spacecraft, we 
find there are other significant operational cost 
drivers that can result in a relatively young 
mission, like Magellan, being phased out before the 
spacecraft is inoperable. 
3. A SEASONAL MOS 
An examination of the typical approach in 
establishing the MOS (or Ground System [GS], in 
Cassini’s nomenclature) for a JPL flight project 
provides an insight into another cause of the 
significant growth of MOS costs. The MOS has 
traditionally been designed as a custom system to 
support a single project. The rationale for such an 
approach lies in the perception of the uniqueness of 
each project and its requirements for support. 
Further, we have only to look at the Voyager, 
Magellan, Ulysses, TOPEX, and Galileo projects to 
see that this approach has been successful in terms 
of mission performance. Each of these projects 
had or has a complete cadre of project-dedicated 
operational teams and support systems. Even 
though Magellan moved forward with the initial 
delivery of a multimission ground data system 
(MGDS), its version of the MGDS software is 
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unique and incompatible with the software versions 
of the other projects that are 
to the newer system. Even JPL‘s newest major 
project, Cassini, while using institutional or 
multimission resources that are available, still 
maintains a project-unique organizational structure 
for its ground system. It is time to look closer at 
this approach to determine the factors that spawn 
substantial costs, especially in comparison to the 
return they provide. 
g the transition 
3.1 Let’s Reinvent the Wheel 
In the effort to design a MOS to support a specific 
project, there is a significant duplication of 
previous efforts and costs, that is, a real tendency 
to reinvent the wheel. The basic reason for the 
duplication is that there does not exist any single 
organization at JPL to take the lead and develop 
standards for operational processes, procedures, 
and interfaces that can be used directly or adapted 
for successive missions. An example within JPL is 
the matrix organization with expertise in MOS 
design, space flight operations, navigation, etc. 
spread among the technical divisions and then 
drawn upon and managed by each project as the 
project perceives the need. Even the Mission 
Operations System Office (MOSO), whose name 
sounds as if they might have a global operational 
role, has limited responsibilities in the areas of 
ground system development, mission control, and 
data management, to develop narrowly defined 
multimission capabilities. Consequently, projects 
like Cassini, rather than taking advantage of a 
standard operations approach through an established 
organization, continue to duplicate earlier efforts by 
designing their own MOS and expending the 
resources for boards to review the designs and the 
delivery schedules for project software, procedures, 
plans, etc. Another drawback to the current 
approach, which a single organization would 
mitigate, is the potential for under utilization of 
valuable resources. 
3.2 Effective Personnel Utilization 
Establishing project-dedicated teams, especially for 
nearly identical functions, can significantly under 
utilize a critical resource at JPL, namely, our 
people. The basis for this assertion is in the nature 
of mission operations that are continual but not 
continuous functions that must be executed in the 
conduct of operations. This mans  that during a 
normal workshift, a certain amount of dead time 
can exist between real-time supports, while a 
software routine is running, or while data is being 
recorded for later analysis. This time could be 
used for support of other projects or tasks, 
assuming the person is properly qualified and 
trained. A classic example, and one in which some 
progress is being made, is mission control. It is 
not too hard to conceive of having a single 
individual to monitor a data playback for one 
project and a non-commanding tracking pass for a 
second project, either serially or in parallel, rather 
than having a dedicated controller for each project, 
as is currently the norm. The potential for 
unnecessary waste of an important resource clearly 
exists with our existing approach to mission 
operations systems. 
4. CUSTOMER FOCUS 
A single MOS would, in theory, have definite 
advantages, but we must assess how such a global 
approach would work in reality and how the 
development and transition should be approached to 
be certain of its ultimate success. To define what 
the role of a single MOS should be, we must deal 
with a fundamental issue not often dealt with 
directly at JPL. This issue is what Dr. Stone refers 
to as “Customer Focus” (Ref. 1). Who are the 
customers, what do they really need, and what is 
the right way to give them the right product the 
first time? In mission operations, we have 
customers who are both external and internal to 
JPL. Flight projects have external customers who 
are scientists and other users of the data from the 
instruments we send into space. Internally, the 
flight projects themselves are customers who expect 
a set of properly functioning instruments to be 
delivered to a specific locus in space, the 
instruments to be operated successfully, and the 
data from those instruments to be returned to Earth 
and accessible to the intended users. By focusing 
on what these customers want, we can identify an 
approach to mission operations that will in the long 
run be better and more cost-effective than our 
present system, that is, we can be “doing the right 
thing right” (Ref. 1). 
4.1 The Customer’s Real Requirements 
The return of scientific data is the essential driver 
for mission operations. The ultimate goal of 
mission operations is to ensure that the data 
collected from space is provided error-free to the 
user; that is what the customer really wants. 
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Timeliness, correct format, time correlation, etc., 
are additional requirements that support the primary 
goal and that facilitate the use of the data. To 
satisfy its customer, a project places requirements 
on its own operations system. 
traditionally identified detailed requirements, like 
24-hour tracking coverage during the first 30 days 
of flight or a complete checkout of every 
combination of ground system configurations, these 
are not the real requirements. Such requirements 
prevent the MOS from looking at options that may 
better satisfy the project’s real requirements. Take 
the instance in which checkout and configuration of 
the spacecraft is accomplished within a matter of 
days, and the injection is so accurate that the first 
planned maneuver would be superfluous. The real 
requirements for getting the spacecraft safely into 
space and on the proper trajectory have been 
satisfied, and a real need for continued 24-hour 
coverage is questionable. It is apparent that the 
traditional project requirements on a MOS are not 
the truly essential requirements. 
4.2 Pointing to a Single MOS 
When requirements are couched in terms of 
functional performance, a different way of viewing 
how we put a MOS together begins to emerge. 
Rather than the project deciding that dedicated 
teams with specific staffing levels are required to 
support the traditional requirements, the project can 
focus on its needs in the context of functional 
performance and levy the responsibility for working 
the details on the MOS. Following this through, 
for a system to have the capacity, knowledge, 
capabilities, and skills to best conduct mission 
operations at JPL, it must access the experience 
and talent base of JPL across all operational 
disciplines. To do less would invite implementation 
of a less than optimal operational process for a 
project. For example, if the interplanetary 
navigation experience at JPL were ignored, a 
tremendous cost would be incurred to redevelop 
adequate algorithms to process tracking data and 
accurately determine a spacecraft trajectory. Thus, 
utilizing all disciplines is crucial and points to 
establishing a singularly managed MOS for all 
projects. 
4.3 Moving Towards Cost Effectiveness 
By melding the operational disciplines into a single 
entity responsible for delivering individual customer 
needs in terms of functional performance, a more 
effective and efficient 
apparent in our current situation, in which several 
projeet MOSS compete for the best talent and 
resources. The reason i s  clear: sharing resources 
and talent provides each project access to the best 
concepts and an equitable share of support targeted 
at satisfying actual performance requirements. If, 
for instance, the planning and scheduling of 
tracking and commanding support is an integrated 
activity, then the supports can be distributed into a 
sequence of events that meets performance 
requirements and spreads the necessary workload 
around the clock. Unitary management of a MOS 
to support all projects leads to more effective and 
efficient operations and brings us to the point of 
addressing what the role and structure of the MOS 
should be. 
OS can be achieved than is 
5. A MOS FOR ALL SEASONS 
The necessity of accessing a broad spectrum of 
talent and skills within JPL implies a broad role for 
the MOS to integrate mission operations across the 
range of JPL projects more efficiently and 
effectively. This role would appropriately cover all 
aspects of operations from the pre-launch tests and 
launch operations through the entire mission until 
delivery of all the captured data to the science 
community. Such a broad scope of coverage 
provides operational continuity during the entire 
opportunity for significant contact and interaction 
with the spacecraft under operatio 
operational conditions. Responsi 
MOS would encompass managing the delivery of 
ground data system capabilities that can support 
each mission and that provide an integrated 
capability so as not to adversely affect the ability or 
cost for the MOS to support all projects. The 
planning of operations and spacecraft sequencing in 
response to mission plans and endeavoring to 
reduce interference or conflicts between support 
requirements and distribute the workload to make 
staffing management easier is also within the 
purview of the MOS. Resource scheduling for both 
flight projects and external requirements would be a 
MOS task to provide a single clearinghouse that 
can make decisions to resolve potential conflicts. 
The direction and implementation of all aspects of 
operations, including operating the ground system, 
Commanding the spacecraft, trajectory 
determination and prediction, telemetry processing, 
spacecraft health and status analysis, data archiving 
and distribution, with associated support processes, 
are clearly within the charter of this MOS. 
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Additionally, development of standard processes 
and procedures as well as operational interfaces to 
simplify and facilitate the capability of supporting 
all projects effectively, and the dissemination of 
these good operational practices through f o m l  
training are significant elements of the MOS role. 
This latter aspect of standardization and training is 
particularly important in achieving cost 
effectiveness across all projects and can be seen to 
be quite practical once one looks at what the 
functional performance requirements are for 
operations versus the current approach for 
specifying MOS requirements. Embracing such a 
broad scope for the MOS role is needed to ensure 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the MOS to 
satisfy the real operational requirements-that of 
safely delivering a set of instruments to space and 
returning the scientific data they collect in a usable 
form to the science community. 
5.1 Looks Like . . . 
The selected structure (see Figure 1) of the MOS 
must complement the breadth of its role. This 
implies an organizational level on a par with that of 
flight projects to facilitate communication and a 
cooperative effort to best achieve the primary goal 
of each project. To further facilitate effective 
cooperation and equitable treatment, a dedicated 
project mission manager is an invaluable member 
of the MOS staff. Other elements of a single MOS 
would parallel those of existing MOSS except that 
they would all be responsible for the full range of 
JPL flight projects. Some of these elements are 
either in place or being implemented in the areas of 
mission control, data system operations, and 
telemetry and data acquisition operations. Others, 
like data management and navigation, have the 
capability already and merely require the formal 
organizational realignment to achieve full 
multimission capability within a single element. 
The design and generation of command sequences 
would be handled by a single element, although 
there would surely be some pockets of expertise for 
any essential project-unique applications. Still, the 
basic concepts, especially as processes are 
standardized, are similar, if not identical, which 
makes support of distinct projects a practical 
matter. A planning and integration element is vital 
to the unified MOS. The need to distribute 
supports and coordinate and integrate activities to 
apportion workload and resource utilization 
equitably is fundamental and can only be achieved 
through a single element with the responsibility and 
authority to develop operational plans and to 
allocate resources accordingly. Perhaps the most 
challenging domain for consolidation is the analysis 
of spacecraft health and status and contingency 
responses. This would, in fact, involve spacecraft 
dedicated effort during critical events. A team of 
spacecraft subsystem experts would be routinely 
involved in daily health and status, event 
verification, and command planning and review 
activities. Each individual would have received 
vehicle-specific training in more than one of our 
spacecraft to provide for backup during high 
activity and coverage during absences. 
Additionally, during and immediately following 
launch and until the spacecraft is safely configured 
and characterized, personnel with an in-depth 
knowledge of the spacecraft gained during 
development, test, and launch preparation activities 
would supplemeqt the primary analysis element. 
Additional expertise would also be identified for 
support during selected critical activities as 
identified by a project’s mission manager. The 
concept for this organizational structure is intended 
to ensure that each project’s actual requirements 
can and are met in a safe and timely manner while 
utilizing available workpower and other resources 
effectively and efficiently. An essential element to 
achieve this efficiency is a structured training and 
certification effort that promulgates the 
standardization and implementation of good 
operational practices as well as addresses those 
areas of knowledge and capabilities that are really 
project-unique. The result of this organizational 
approach is a MOS that can satisfy the functional 
performance requirements of existing JPL projects 
and make the necessary adjustments or growth to 
do the same for future projects. 
5.2 Not a Yellow Brick Road 
To get to such a MOS organization is not an 
overnight task. It will require extensive planning 
and even cultural changes. Just as it is not an 
overnight task, neither is it a perpetual task. The 
approach is straightforward and doable if the 
commitment is forthcoming. The initial effort 
involves establishing a core organization with 
operational, project, and training expertise to lay 
the foundation. This foundation involves 
establishing standard approaches to operations, 
chronicling good operational practices, drafting 
interface control documents, and developing 
positional and scenario operational training. Once 
this foundation is developed and codified, the next 
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Figure I - Candidate MOS Structure 
phase, the implementation of the training programs, 
begins. This activity prepares the existing project- 
dedicated teams to merge personnel and expand 
their scope of responsibilities. When this phase has 
been accomplished, the staffing can be adjusted to 
match the operational workload. Finally, the 
process is established for incorporation of new 
projects. This process includes development of 
training, delivery of the training, implementation of 
operations, and adjustment of staffing. 
Another point needs to be made regarding the MOS 
and the implementation of standard processes, 
procedures, and interfaces. One might logically 
assume that taking such an approach and controlling 
these items could lead to stagnation within the MOS 
with respect to new techniques and technology. 
Such is not the case. In fact, such an approach 
actually facilitates change and improvement. First, 
through the control process, proposed changes and 
modifications are assessed as to their benefit and 
cost to the MOS as a whole. Then, because 
interfaces are controlled, it is possible to implement 
a new technique within a subsystem or element or 
to apply a technological advance, such as tools 
utilizing expert systems, without disrupting the 
entire system. To the rest of the system, with 
proper interface control, a changed element or 
subsystem need not look any different. 
Improvements can be made and even interfaces 
changed if there is a proper cost-benefit ratio. The 
crucial factors are that the change is controlled and 
documented and that the effects of the change are 
incorporated into the operational training whenever 
appropriate. 
5.3 A Cornerstone 
Because effective training is fundamental to the 
success of the implementation of a single MOS, it 
is appropriate to consider the training approach to 
be implemented. The approach would be 
systematic and based upon the operational jobs to 
be performed. It would differ from other 
approaches to technical training in that the emphasis 
is on how the system functions (Ref. 2) and the 
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cognitive involvement of operations personnel as 
opposed to a structured set of tasks typically 
associated with technical training. In developing 
the training for the cognitive involvement, our 
operational training would also rely upon network 
analyses of operational and system experts’ models 
(Ref. 3) of the spacecraft, the ground systems, and 
the operational processes. The results of these 
analyses would be used to structure both the 
positional and scenario training for operations with 
the content based on the job performance 
requirements. The training process also involves 
validation through MOS-level rehearsals and 
readiness testing as well as updating to improve 
effectiveness and incorporate new projects. By 
using this systematic approach, the training element 
can in fact effectively provide the foundation upon 
which to build a MOS for all seasons. 
6. OPINION 
With the need to hold the line on budgets, 
operations costs are a valid arena to examine, as 
demonstrated by the Magellan project. By 
addressing the real p e r f o m c e  requirements, it is 
possible to identify a NOS structure that can be 
effective without being dedicated exclusively to a 
single flight project. The role of a single MOS 
would necessarily span all of operations, from pre- 
launch through mission operations to project 
termination. To be effective, the MOS would be a 
distinct organization with authority to make and 
implement the decisions that are the organization’s 
responsibiIity. The foundation for such an 
organization is assured in the development of 
standard processes, procedures, and interfaces and, 
of utmost importance, in a formal training process 
to propagate these standards and good operational 
practices. It would also prepare the system for new 
projects as they develop. With the application of 
the necessary effort, JPL can achieve a single MOS 
management structure that draws from the matrix 
organization to support all flight projects cost 
effectively and to stand the projects in good stead 
whatever the season. 
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